Amerigas v. Opinion Corp. by United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
AMERIGAS PROPANE, L.P., :
: CIVIL ACTION
Plaintiff, :
:
v. :
:
OPINION CORP. d/b/a : NO.  12-713
PISSEDCONSUMER.COM, :
:
Defendant. :
MEMORANDUM
BUCKWALTER, S.J. June 19 , 2012
Defendant Opinion Corp. d/b/a PissedConsumer.com (“Defendant”) has filed the present
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint of Plaintiff Amerigas Propane, L.P. (“Plaintiff”) for Failure to
State a Claim Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  For the following reasons,
the Motion is granted in part and denied part as set forth in the accompanying Order.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff, a Pennsylvania limited partnership, is in the business of distributing propane. 
(Compl. ¶¶ 3, 9.)  In connection with this business, Plaintiff owns a trademark registration for
“AMERIGAS.”  (Id. ¶ 10.)  Defendant, a New York corporation, owns and operates a website
called “www.pissedconsumer.com,” which allows individuals to post complaints concerning
various products and services they have used.  (Id. ¶¶ 13-18.)  According to the facts alleged in
the Complaint, Defendant “encourages and creates the most negative postings it can on the
PissedConsumer website, displays those postings as prominently on the Internet as possible, and
relates those postings as closely as possible to the companies’ brand names.”  (Id. ¶ 20.)  Once
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these reviews are posted, Defendant uses them as an incentive to compel businesses to pay to
have negative complaints hidden, removed, or changed into positive testimonials.  (Id. ¶¶ 20-21.) 
According to Plaintiff, Defendant refuses to reveal the identity of those who post complaints,
leaving Plaintiff unable to determine whether the reviews are submitted by actual consumers,
competitors, or Defendant itself.  (Id. ¶ 26.)  
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has used the “AMERIGAS” trademark in one of its 
website’s subdomains—http://amerigas.pissedconsumer.com—and in the metadata  associated1
with the website.  (Id. ¶¶ 27-30.)  Furthermore, the website contains numerous
advertisements—including those of Plaintiff’s competitors—alongside a description of Plaintiff’s
business and the services it offers.  (Id. ¶¶ 32-33.)  According to Plaintiff, its competitors’
advertisements are “displayed in a cluttered fashion and used in connection with AmeriGas’s
trademark,” and so consumers are likely to be confused into believing that these advertisements
are in some way associated with Plaintiff.  (Id. ¶ 35.)  Defendant is able to profit from these
advertisements via Google’s “AdWords” program, which generates revenue every time a user
clicks on one of the ads.  (Id. ¶ 34.) 
Plaintiff next alleges that Defendant engages in improper “search engine optimization”2
techniques in an effort to make its website more prominent and accessible on search engines such
  The Complaint defines metadata as “data associated with a website that is written in1
HTML code and read by search engines that index the website.  Computer users using Internet
Explorer can view a website’s metadata if they select ‘View’ and ‘Source’ in the menu bar when
visiting the website.”  (Id. ¶ 30 n.1.)  
  Search engine optimization “refers to the process through which a company improves2
its website’s visibility or ranking in search engines’ ‘natural’ or unpaid search results.”  (Id. ¶
39.)   
2
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as Google.  (Id. ¶¶ 38-42.)  Specifically, Defendant has purportedly purchased hundreds of
domain names that link to its own website, created numerous subdomains that interlink to each
other, made excessive use of brand name “keywords” to increase its own website’s relevance,
reposted identical consumer complaints to create the impression that they are new content, and
created Twitter accounts that link to Defendant’s website without providing any other content. 
(Id. ¶ 40.)  As a result of these tactics, Defendant’s website now appears among the first several
results when an Internet user types “AmeriGas” into a Google search, despite the fact that
Defendant’s page offers little, if any, content related to Plaintiff and its services.  (Id. ¶ 38.)  
When Plaintiff became concerned about the impact of the negative reviews posted on
http://amerigas.pissedconsumer.com, it contacted Defendant to discuss PissedConsumer’s
“reputation management services.”  (Id. ¶¶ 43-46.)  These services purportedly offered Plaintiff
the opportunity to address the complaints, or even have negative reviews removed from
Defendant’s website altogether.  (Id. ¶ 53.)  In January 2011, Defendant told Plaintiff it would
not be able to discuss the matter until the following month, but Defendant never contacted
Plaintiff to engage in such a discussion.  (Id. ¶¶ 46-47.)  Plaintiff then attempted to respond
directly to the complaints by posting its own messages on Defendant’s page, but found that
Defendant blocked Plaintiff’s computers from accessing the website.  (Id. ¶¶ 48-49.)  
Plaintiff filed its Complaint in this Court on February 9, 2012, alleging the following: (I)
trademark infringement, unfair competition, and false designation of origin in violation of 15
U.S.C. §§ 1114 & 1125(a); (II) common law trademark infringement, unfair competition, and
false designation of origin; (III) dilution of Plaintiff’s “AMERIGAS” mark in violation of 15
U.S.C. § 1125(c); (IV) violations of Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
3
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Protection Law, 73 Pa. C.S. § 201-1, et seq. (“the UTPCPL”); (V) interference with contractual
and prospective contractual relations; (VI) unjust enrichment; and (VII) trademark counterfeiting
in violation of the Lanham Act.  (Compl. ¶¶ 54-111.)  Plaintiff seeks preliminary and permanent
injunctive relief; actual, compensatory, and punitive damages; and costs, attorneys’ fees, and
treble and statutory damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117.  (Compl. 19-20 (“Prayer for
Relief”).)  
Defendant filed the present Motion to Dismiss on April 2, 2012.  On April 19, 2012,
Plaintiff filed its Response in Opposition, and Defendant filed a Reply Brief on April 27, 2012. 
The Motion is now ripe for the Court’s consideration.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant bears the burden of
demonstrating that the plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see also Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005).  In Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the United States Supreme Court recognized that “a
plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.”  Id. at 555.  It emphasized that it would not require a “heightened fact pleading of specifics,
but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Id. at 570.
In the subsequent case of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court
enunciated two fundamental principles applicable to a court’s review of a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.  First, it noted that “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.  Threadbare recitals of
4
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the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”  Id.
at 678.  Thus, although “[Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 8 marks a notable and generous
departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era . . . it does not unlock the
doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”  Id. at 678-79. 
Second, the Supreme Court emphasized that “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for
relief survives a motion to dismiss.”  Id. at 679.  “Determining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”  Id. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, nothing in Twombly or Iqbal has altered some of the
fundamental underpinnings of the Rule 12(b)(6) standard of review.  Arner v. PGT Trucking,
Inc., No. Civ.A.09-0565, 2010 WL 1052953, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2010); Spence v.
Brownsville Area Sch. Dist., No. Civ.A.08-0626, 2008 WL 2779079, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 15,
2008).  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires only a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and need not contain detailed factual allegations. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8; Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008).  Further, the
court must “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.”  Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006). 
Finally, the court must “determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the
plaintiff may be entitled to relief.”  Pinkerton v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d
Cir. 2002).   
III. DISCUSSION 
Defendant first moves to dismiss Counts I, II, III, IV, and VII of the Complaint—which
5
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sound in trademark infringement and unfair competition—on the basis that Plaintiff failed to
allege sufficient facts to sustain these claims.  Second, Defendant contends that Counts IV, V,
and VI—which are Pennsylvania state law claims—should be dismissed pursuant to the
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230.  The Court considers Defendant’s two
arguments separately.   3
 A. Whether Plaintiff has Stated a Claim for Trademark Infringement and
Unfair Competition
The purpose of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, et. seq., is “to make ‘actionable the
deceptive and misleading use of marks’ and ‘to protect persons engaged in . . . commerce against
unfair competition.’”  Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 767-68 (1992)
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127).  Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges trademark infringement,
unfair competition, and false designation of origin in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1114  and §4
  The Motion to Dismiss also includes a brief analysis of why Plaintiff is not entitled to3
an injunction.  (Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss (“Def.’s Mem.”) 24-26.)  Plaintiff contends that
because it has not yet moved for a preliminary injunction, any discussion of this issue is
premature.  (Pl.’s Resp. Opp’n 2.)  The Court agrees and declines to address injunctive relief
unless and until Plaintiff makes an appropriate motion.    
  Section 1114 states in relevant part:4
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant—
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with
which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive; or 
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and
apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels,
signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to
be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
6
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1125(a).   In order to state a claim under these sections of the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must5
demonstrate: “(1) the mark is valid and legally protectable; (2) it owns the mark; and (3) the
defendant’s use of the mark is likely to create confusion concerning the origin of goods or
services.”  Del. Valley Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 640 F. Supp. 2d 603, 619 (E.D.
Pa. 2009) (citing Urban Outfitters, Inc. v. BCBG Max Azria Grp., Inc., 318 F. App’x 146, 148
(3d Cir. 2009)).  “A likelihood of confusion exists when ‘consumers viewing the mark would
probably assume that the product or service it represents is associated with the source of a
distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with
which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive, 
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided.
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1).  
  Section § 1125(a) states in relevant part:5
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for
goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which— 
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the
origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial
activities by another person, or 
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics,
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or
commercial activities, 
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is
likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).  
7
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different product or service identified by a similar mark.’”  A & H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s
Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198, 211 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Dranoff-Perlstein Assocs. v. Sklar,
967 F.2d 852, 862 (3d Cir. 1992)).  When the plaintiff and the defendant’s goods do not compete
with each other, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has set forth a list of ten factors that district
courts should consider when determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists:
“(1) the degree of similarity between the owner’s mark and the alleged infringing
mark; (2) the strength of the owner’s mark; (3) the price of the goods and other
factors indicative of the care and attention expected of consumers when making a
purchase; (4) the length of time the defendant has used the mark without evidence of
actual confusion arising; (5) the intent of the defendant in adopting the mark; (6) the
evidence of actual confusion; (7) whether the goods, though not competing, are
marketed through the same channels of trade and advertised through the same media;
(8) the extent to which the targets of the parties’ sales efforts are the same; (9) the
relationship of the goods in the minds of consumers because of the similarity of
function; (10) other facts suggesting that the consuming public might expect the prior
owner to manufacture a product in the defendant’s market, or that he is likely to
expand into that market.”
A & H Sportswear, 237 F.3d at 211 (quoting Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d
Cir. 1983)).  
Count II alleges common law trademark infringement, unfair competition, and false
designation of origin.  In Pennsylvania, common law trademark infringement and unfair
competition are governed by the same standards as their federal counterparts, which were
addressed above in discussing Count I.  R&B, Inc. v. Needa Parts Mfg., Inc., 418 F. Supp. 2d
684, 697 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 2005).  It is not clear that common law false designation of origin is a
viable cause of action, as the Court was unable to find any cases or other authorities discussing
this claim.  Nevertheless, because neither party has addressed this issue, the Court assumes for
the purposes of this Memorandum that Pennsylvania recognizes such a claim.  
8
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Count III is a claim for trademark dilution pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).  Dilution
refers to “‘the weakening of the ability of a mark to clearly and unmistakably distinguish the
source of a product.’”  MarbleLife, Inc. v. Stone Res., Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d 552, 561 (E.D. Pa.
2010) (quoting Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums, Inc., 381 F.3d 477, 489 (5th Cir. 2004)). 
Section 1125(c) prohibits the “use of a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause
dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the presence or
absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury.”  15 U.S.C. §
1125(c)(1).
Count IV is a claim for violation of the UTPCPL, which “‘encompasses an array of
practices which might be analogized to passing off, misappropriation, trademark infringement,
disparagement, false advertising, fraud, breach of contract, and breach of warranty.’”  Sikirica v.
Nationwide Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 214, 226-27 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting DiLucido v. Terminix, 676
A.2d 1237, 1240 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)).  The statute provides a private cause of action for “[a]ny
person who purchases or leases goods or services primarily for personal, family or household
purposes and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a
result of the use or employment by any person of a method, act or practice declared unlawful by
section 3 of this act[.]”  73 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 201-9.2.   Finally, Count VII is a claim for6
trademark counterfeiting, which is prohibited under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1).  The elements of this
  Plaintiff has not alleged that it has purchased or leased goods or services from6
Defendant for personal, family, or household use, and so it is not clear to the Court that Plaintiff
has standing to bring a UTPCPL claim.  Indeed, Plaintiff has not specified which section of the
statute Defendant has allegedly violated.  Nevertheless, neither party has addressed this issue,
and so the Court will assume for the purposes of this Memorandum that Plaintiff has standing to
proceed.  
9
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claim are identical to those of a claim for trademark infringement.  See, e.g., Coach, Inc. v.
Sunfastic Tanning Resort, No. Civ.A.10-1626, 2011 WL 5447972, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 10,
2011). 
In its Motion, Defendant does not separately address the elements and merits of Counts I,
II, III, IV, and VII.  Rather, because they all relate to trademark infringement or unfair
competition, Defendant groups these Counts together and seeks to dismiss them on the same five
grounds: (1) Plaintiff has failed to allege the use of “AMERIGAS” as a trademark; (2) this case
involves nominative fair use; (3) the Complaint does not allege a likelihood of confusion; (4) the
doctrine of “initial interest confusion” is inapplicable to this action; and (5) Plaintiff has failed to
plead a claim for secondary trademark liability.  The Court considers each of these five
arguments separately.  
1. Whether Plaintiff Alleged the Use of “AMERIGAS” as a Trademark
Defendant first contends that Plaintiff’s claims must fail because they do not allege that
Defendant used “AMERIGAS” as a trademark.  Specifically, Defendant argues that “the message
complained of is merely critical speech utilizing a trademark to accurately describe the trademark
owner’s produce or service.  It is not the offering of a competing good or service.”  (Def.’s Mem.
7.)  In making this argument, Defendant relies on two cases from the District of New Jersey. 
First, in Cellco Partnership v. Communication Workers of America, No. Civ.A.02-5542, 2003
WL 25888375 (D.N.J. Dec. 11, 2003), the defendant was a labor union that used Plaintiff’s
trademark in statements made during a labor dispute.  Id. at *1.  The court found that the plaintiff
had used the mark “as a means of bolstering its message as it attempted to maintain its members’
employment and negotiate the continued terms of their employment[.]”  Id. at *4.  The court held
10
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that “expression on the merits of a labor dispute” did not constitute a “use in commerce,” and
was therefore not actionable under the Lanham Act.  Id. at *8.
Next, in Howard Johnson International, Inc. v. Vraj Brig, LLC, No. Civ.A.08-1466, 2010
WL 215381 (D.N.J. Jan. 14, 2010), one of the defendants contracted with the plaintiff to use its
“Howard Johnson” marks in connection with the operation of a hotel.  Id. at *1.  The contract
was eventually terminated and the defendant ceased operating the hotel, but a billboard bearing
the name “Howard Johnson” remained on the property.  Id. at *1-2.  In light of the fact that the
hotel was no longer in use, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the presence of the
billboard on the defendant’s property violated the Lanham Act.  Specifically, the court found that
the defendant never
did anything other than passively allow a preexisting billboard containing [the
plaintiff’s] marks to remain standing on his property.  Therefore, [the defendant]
never “used” the protected marks within the meaning of that term as it appears in the
Lanham Act.  Furthermore, even if [the defendant] were held to have “used” [the
plaintiff’s] marks, he never offered or provided any goods or services at the lodging
facility in question.  Therefore, his display of the marks does not satisfy the “in
connection with goods or services” requirement either.
Id. at *7.  These two cases are distinguishable from the present matter.  In Cellco, the mark was
used in the context of the defendant’s labor dispute, not as part of any for-profit or other
commercial activity.  In Howard Johnson, the mark was not “used” at all: the hotel which the
billboard had previously advertised had ceased operating.  Here, by contrast, the Complaint
alleges that Defendant uses Plaintiff’s “AMERIGAS” trademark in its website’s text, subdomain
name, and metadata in connection with the sale of advertisements to Plaintiff’s competitors. 
(Compl. ¶¶ 27-37.)  At least one other court in this District has held that a “defendant’s use of [a]
plaintiff’s marks to trigger internet advertisements for itself is the type of use consistent with the
11
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language in the Lanham Act[.]”  J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C. Ltd. P’ship v. Settlement Funding LLC,
No. Civ.A.06-0597, 2007 WL 30115, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007).   Furthermore, Plaintiff also7
alleges that, for a fee, Defendant will allow businesses to address the complaints posted about
them on the website.  (Compl. ¶¶ 44, 53.)  Finally, in an extremely similar case brought against
Defendant in the Eastern District of New York—a case upon which Defendant heavily relies
throughout its brief—the court found that the allegations satisfied the “use in commerce”
requirement.  Ascentive, LLC v. Opinion Corp., No. Civ.A.10-4433, 2011 WL 6181452, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2011) (“There is no dispute regarding the validity of plaintiffs’ marks or that
PissedConsumer used the marks in commerce and in connection with goods and services.”).
Accordingly, regardless of whether or not these allegations satisfy other requirements for a claim
of trademark infringement, the Court finds that the Complaint sufficiently alleges that Defendant
used Plaintiff’s mark “in commerce” and “in connection with any goods or services” for purposes
of stating a claim under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1125(a). 
2. Whether this Case Involves Nominative Fair Use
“Nominative” fair use of a trademark can occur when “the only practical way to refer to
something is to use the trademarked term.’”  Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc.,
425 F.3d 211, 214 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I,
  The Court acknowledges that, unlike the Defendant in the present matter, the defendant7
in J.G. Wentworth offered the same services as the plaintiff whose mark it was using. 
Nevertheless, the Court finds that Defendant’s alleged use of Plaintiff’s mark to sell advertising
to others—as opposed to advertising its own products—is sufficient for purposes of the “use in
commerce” requirement of the Lanham Act.  The fact that Defendant and Plaintiff do not
compete is certainly relevant to whether Defendant’s use of the “AMERIGAS” mark causes
customer confusion, but an allegation of competition is not necessary to establish that Defendant
used the mark in connection with the services it offered on http://amerigas.pissedconsumer.com.  
12
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Inc., 328 F.3d 1061, 1072 (9th Cir. 2003)).  The Third Circuit has set forth a two-step approach
for analyzing whether the nominative use is fair, and therefore permitted under the Lanham Act. 
First, “[t]he plaintiff must first prove that confusion is likely due to the defendant’s use of
plaintiff’s mark.”  Id. at 222.  To determine whether the plaintiff meets this burden, courts should
consider four of the ten factors traditionally used to assess likelihood of confusion:
(1) the price of the goods and other factors indicative of the care and attention
expected of consumers when making a purchase; (2) the length of time the defendant
has used the mark without evidence of actual confusion; (3) the intent of the
defendant in adopting the mark; and (4) the evidence of actual confusion.
Id. at 225-26.  Once the plaintiff shows that confusion is likely, the burden shifts to the defendant
“to show that its nominative use of plaintiff’s mark is nonetheless fair.”  Id. at 222.  The
defendant satisfies the fairness requirement by demonstrating the following: 
(1) that the use of plaintiff’s mark is necessary to describe both the plaintiff’s product
or service and the defendant’s product or service; (2) that the defendant uses only so
much of the plaintiff’s mark as is necessary to describe plaintiff’s product; and (3)
that the defendant’s conduct or language reflect the true and accurate relationship
between plaintiff and defendant’s products or services.
Id.  
Here, Defendant contends that its purpose in employing the “AMERIGAS” trademark
was merely to describe Plaintiff’s goods and services, not to compete with Plaintiff, and so this
action should be treated as a nominative fair use case.  (Def.’s Mem. 8-9.)  Plaintiff cursorily
rejects this argument, asserting only that “Defendant’s profits from its use of AmeriGas’[s]
trademark through the AdWords program completely undercut any notion of ‘nominative use’ of
AmeriGas’[s] mark.”  (Pl.’s Resp. Opp’n 7.)   8
  In support of this argument, Plaintiff relies on Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape8
Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004).  The Third Circuit, however, has
13
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Applying the Third Circuit’s two-part analysis, the Court concludes that it would be
premature to make any findings with respect to nominative fair use without the benefit of
discovery.  The four factors used to assess likelihood of confusion in this context—the care and
attention expected of consumers when making a purchase, the length of time the mark was used
without confusion, Defendant’s intent, and actual evidence of confusion—are all fact-intensive,
and require evidentiary support.   Similarly, the Court cannot conclude whether Defendant’s use9
of the mark is “fair” based solely on the allegations contained in the Complaint.  The three-part
fairness test first requires the Court to determine whether Defendant’s use of Plaintiff’s mark is
necessary to describe both Plaintiff and Defendant’s services.  As the operator of a so-called
“gripe site”—a website that allows users to post negative reviews and comments about various
businesses—it is highly probable that Defendant would prevail on this element, as it would be
impossible for users to effectively criticize Plaintiff without naming it.  The second and third
elements, however, necessitate more substantial factual development.  These require the Court to
determine that Defendant uses only so much of Plaintiff’s mark as is necessary to describe
Plaintiff’s product, and that Defendant’s conduct or language accurately reflects the relationship
between Plaintiff and Defendant’s products or services.  Accordingly, the Court denies
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss on this basis.  
expressly rejected the nominative fair use analysis employed by the Ninth Circuit in that case. 
See Century 21, 425 F.3d at 228 (“[W]e conclude that the [Ninth Circuit’s] test as written suffers
from a lack of clarity.  This is evident in the contortions that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
itself has gone through in applying it, the confusion that the District Court here encountered in its
application, and in our conviction that a modified inquiry would aid in reaching the right
result.”).  The Court therefore declines to rely on Playboy as a persuasive precedent.
  A discussion of the remaining six likelihood of confusion factors is contained in the9
following section of the Memorandum.  
14
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3. Likelihood of Confusion
Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s trademark claims must be dismissed because there is
no likelihood of confusion.  (Def.’s Mem. 9-13.)  According to Defendant, “claims such as those
made by [Plaintiff] here cannot amount to a well-pleaded allegation of a likelihood of confusion
because it would be obvious to any prospective customer that the trademark use could not be
originating with or approved by the claimant.”  (Id. at 10.)  In response, Plaintiff asserts that
customers are likely to be confused by the following: 
(1) the sheer number of AmeriGas’[s] competitors’ advertisements that appear on the
website; (2) the cluttered fashion in which those advertisements are displayed; (3) the
overwhelming, top-heavy placement of those advertisements on the “AmeriGas”
subdomain, before users even see the consumer reviews and comments; and (4)
Defendant’s use of Plaintiff’s “AMERIGAS” trademark in its website metadata.
(Pl.’s Resp. Opp’n 8.)  Essentially, Plaintiff appears to be claiming that prospective customers
would see the “AMERIGAS” mark in Defendant’s subdomain, assume that the website was
affiliated with Plaintiff, and click on one of the advertisements posted by Plaintiff’s competitors,
believing that the ad would direct them to products and services provided by Plaintiff itself.  
As discussed above, the Third Circuit typically considers ten factors to determine whether
or not the use of a mark would create a likelihood of confusion.  See A & H Sportswear, 237
F.3d at 211.  In the previous section, the Court briefly addressed factors three through six, which
are applied in the narrow context of nominative fair use.  An analysis of the remaining six factors
further convinces the Court that this litigation should be allowed to proceed to the discovery
phase.    
The first and second factors are: (1) the degree of similarity between the owner’s mark
and the alleged infringing mark, and (2) the strength of the owner’s mark.  Here, Defendant is
15
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using the exact mark owned by Plaintiff, which the Complaint alleges “is a valid and distinctive
federally registered trademark[.]”  (Compl. ¶ 55.)  The seventh factor—whether non-competing
goods are marketed through the same channels of trade and advertised through the same
media—arguably supports Plaintiff’s allegations, as both parties market their services on the
Internet.  The next factor looks to whether the targets of the parties’ sales efforts are the same. 
The facts of this case make this a complicated consideration.  While it is true that Defendant is
not in the business of selling propane, it allegedly profits from attracting Plaintiff’s customers to
its website.  If the unhappy purchasers of Plaintiff’s products are posting complaints on
http://amerigas.pissedconsumer.com, Plaintiff’s competitors may be more likely to advertise on
Defendant’s website, and Plaintiff may be more inclined to pay for Defendant’s reputation
management services.  Next, looking to the relationship of the goods in the minds of consumers
because of the similarity of function, the Court finds that this factor favors Defendant.  Even
assuming that Defendant in some way profits from having Plaintiff’s customers access its
website, the goods offered by each party in no way overlap.  The final factor essentially examines
whether Plaintiff is likely to expand into Defendant’s market.  Because there is no allegation that
Plaintiff intends to create an Internet forum for disgruntled consumers, this element also favors
Defendant. 
After considering the likelihood of confusion factors, the Court concludes that Plaintiff
has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for relief.  In making this determination, the Court is
mindful of the Eastern District of New York’s Ascentive opinion, which involved similar, if not
identical, claims of trademark infringement and unfair competition against Defendant.  In ruling
on the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, the Ascentive court stated the following in
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regards to the likelihood of confusion element:
There is little likelihood that a potential consumer visiting PissedConsumer would
be confused about whether it was the source of plaintiffs’ goods or whether [the
plaintiffs] sponsored or otherwise approved of PissedConsumer’s use of their marks. 
Indeed, the domain names here . . . bespeak negativity concerning plaintiffs’
products.  So too does PissedConsumer’s logo—a frowning red cartoon face with a
furrowed brow and a speech bubble containing characters in place of an
expletive—and PissedConsumer’s tagline: “TELL THE WORLD.  BE HEARD.” 
The comments posted on the site are also decidedly negative. . . .  It strains credulity
that an Internet user would believe that plaintiffs would sponsor or otherwise approve
of a site that contains such criticisms.  Instead, after a brief inspection of the content
of PissedConsumer’s website, the user would realize that they were visiting a
third-party gripe site for “pissed” consumers. 
Ascentive, 2011 WL 6181452, at *9.  The Ascentive opinion is well-written and very persuasive. 
This Court also finds it difficult to believe that a person searching online for Plaintiff’s products
would be confused into thinking that a site called “PissedConsumer”—which contains an
abundance negative reviews, offers no propane products of its own, and links to the websites of
Plaintiff’s competitors—was in some way affiliated with or endorsed by Plaintiff.  Nevertheless,
it is also important to emphasize that the Ascentive opinion addressed a motion for a preliminary
injunction, not a motion to dismiss.  In order to prevail, the plaintiffs in that case were required to
demonstrate “‘either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits or (b) sufficiently serious questions
going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping
decidedly in the [plaintiffs’] favor.’”  Id. at *5 (quoting Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 79 (2d
Cir. 2010)).  Here, by contrast, the burden placed on Plaintiff is much lighter.  In order to defeat
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, it must only establish that it has sufficiently stated a claim for
relief, not that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its case.  Furthermore, as Defendant itself
has noted, the ruling in Ascentive came after a discovery period and two evidentiary hearings. 
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(Def.’s Mem. 10.)  While Plaintiff may face a tall task in demonstrating that Defendant’s use of
its mark is confusing, it is entitled to gather evidence to support this claim.  The Court therefore
denies Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss on the basis that Plaintiff failed to allege likelihood of
confusion.       
4. Initial Interest Confusion
Initial interest confusion occurs when a competitor lures “‘potential customers away from
a producer by initially passing off its goods as those of the producer’s, even if confusion as to the
source of the goods is dispelled by the time any sales are consummated.’”  Checkpoint Sys., Inc.
v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 294 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Dorr–Oliver,
Inc. v. Fluid Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 1996)).  The Third Circuit has found that
initial interest confusion is “probative of a Lanham Act violation,” recognizing that “[w]ithout
initial interest protection, an infringer could use an established mark to create confusion as to a
product’s source thereby receiving a ‘free ride on the goodwill’ of the established mark.”  Id. at
294-95.  The concern is that this “bait and switch” will influence “‘the buying decisions of
consumers in the market for the goods, effectively allowing the competitor to get its foot in the
door by confusing consumers.’”  Id. at 294 (quoting Dorr–Oliver, 94 F.3d at 382).  
Defendant cites to Strick Corp. v. Strickland, 162 F. Supp. 2d 372 (E.D. Pa. 2001) for the
proposition that initial interest confusion is of dubious application in the context of the Internet. 
(Def.’s Mem. 14.)  In Strick, the defendant, whose surname was “Strickland,” registered the
domain name “strick.com” for use in connection with his work as a computer consultant and
software developer.  162 F. Supp. 2d at 373.  The plaintiff, “Strick Corp.”, which manufactured
transportation equipment, brought Lanham Act claims against the defendant in connection with
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the use of the domain name.  Id. at 373-75.  The plaintiff argued that defendant’s website would
create initial interest confusion.  Id. at 377.  The court rejected this assertion, finding that 
any initial confusion that arises from Defendant’s use of his strick.com domain
site[—]specifically, that consumers will realize they are at the wrong site and go to
an Internet search engine to find the right one—is not substantial enough to be legally
significant. . . .  It is clear that Internet surfers are inured to the false starts and
excursions awaiting them and are unlikely to be dissuaded, or unnerved when, after
tak[ing] a stab at what they think is the most likely domain name for a particular web
site[,] guess wrong and bring up another’s webpage.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).  In other words, even if a consumer is momentarily
confused into thinking that a website is associated with a particular business, the ease of
navigating the Internet makes it likely that he or she will simply begin a new search once the
confusion is dispelled, rather than settling for the competitor’s product.  
Although Defendant’s argument is well-reasoned, the Court will allow Plaintiff to
proceed under an initial interest confusion theory for three reasons.  First, in Strick, the plaintiff
and the defendant operated completely different businesses, and the defendant’s website made no
reference to the plaintiff or the transportation products it provided.  A consumer who visited the
defendant’s website would therefore be unable to purchase transportation equipment from the
plaintiff or any of its competitors.  In short, there was no possibility of a “bait and switch.”  In
this case, Defendant and Plaintiff do not compete, but Defendant’s website specifically refers to
and describes Plaintiff’s business and provides advertising links to Plaintiff’s competitors. 
Therefore, unlike the factual scenario in Strick, it is at least possible that a consumer who
conducted an Internet search for Plaintiff’s business could arrive at Defendant’s webpage and
purchase propane products from another company.  
Second, the Strick opinion addressed a motion for summary judgment, which was filed
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after the parties had an opportunity to conduct discovery.  Here, on a motion to dismiss, the
Court’s knowledge of how Defendant’s website is structured and operates is limited to the
allegations in the pleadings.  
Third and finally, the Third Circuit has addressed initial interest confusion three times
since the Strick opinion was rendered, and each time it has found it to be a viable theory. 
Checkpoint Sys., 269 F.3d at 294 (“We join these [other federal] circuits in holding that initial
interest confusion is probative of a Lanham Act violation.”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v.
Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 248 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he use here may also give rise to
concerns under the ‘initial interest confusion’ doctrine.”); McNeil Nutritionals, LLC v. Heartland
Sweeteners, LLC, 511 F.3d 350, 358 (3d Cir. 2007) (“We reaffirm the holding that initial interest
confusion is an independently sufficient theory that may be used to prove likelihood of
confusion.”).  This Court was unable to locate anything in the Third Circuit’s jurisprudence to
indicate that a theory of initial interest confusion is categorically prohibited in the Internet
context.  While it may ultimately be difficult to establish initial interest confusion in this case,
Plaintiff may nevertheless present evidence in support of this theory.  Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss on the grounds that initial interest confusion is inapplicable is therefore denied. 
5. Contributory Infringement
The United States Supreme Court has held that 
liability for trademark infringement can extend beyond those who actually mislabel
goods with the mark of another.  Even if a manufacturer does not directly control
others in the chain of distribution, it can be held responsible for their infringing
activities under certain circumstances.  Thus, if a manufacturer or distributor
intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its
product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark
infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributorially responsible for any
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harm done as a result of the deceit.
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853-54 (1982).  The two elements of a
“contributory infringement” claim are: “‘(1) supply of a product, and (2) knowledge of direct
infringement.’”  Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1432
(3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1492, 1498 (E.D.
Cal. 1994)).
Here, Defendant contends that, to the extent Plaintiff alleges it is liable for the comments
or advertisements of third parties appearing on the PissedConsumer website, such a claim for
contributory infringement must be dismissed.  (Def.’s Mem. 15-19.)  Specifically, Defendant
argues that the Complaint fails to allege infringement on the part of anyone other than Defendant. 
(Id.)  Without any underlying trademark violation, it cannot be liable for contributing to that
infringement.  (Id.)  In response, Plaintiff asserts that it has sufficiently alleged Defendant was
“either actually or constructively” aware of the “infringing advertisements” that appeared on its
website.  (Pl.’s Resp. Opp’n 14.)  Accordingly, it has stated a claim for contributory
infringement. 
Contrary to Plaintiff’s characterization of its Complaint, the Court is unable to find any
allegation of trademark infringement by anyone other than Defendant.  In its Response in
Opposition, Plaintiff cites to paragraphs thirty-three and thirty-four of the Complaint as
allegations of infringement by third parties.  Paragraph thirty-three alleges that Defendant
“displays numerous advertisements for third parties’ products and services, including but not
limited to advertisements for AmeriGas’s competitors. . . .  These advertisements appear to be
part of Google’s advertising program.  Some of these advertisements use AmeriGas’s trademark
21
Case 2:12-cv-00713-RB   Document 15   Filed 06/19/12   Page 21 of 26
in the text of the hyperlink that, if clicked, will take the Internet user to an AmeriGas
competitor.”  (Compl. ¶ 33.)  This paragraph merely alleges that third-party advertisers used
Plaintiff’s mark; nowhere does it allege that such use was infringing.  Plaintiff has not cited
to—and the Court is unable to locate—any authority to support the proposition that use of a
trademark in a hyperlink constitutes per se infringement. 
Furthermore, even if the Court assumes Plaintiff intended to allege infringement on the
part of the unnamed third-party advertisers, the Complaint does not specify that Defendant was
aware of this infringement.  Paragraph thirty-four states in its entirety: “The advertisements are
displayed through Google’s ‘AdWords’ advertising program, in which Google allows
PissedConsumer to profit from this display of third-party advertisements on its website every
time a consumer ‘clicks through’ to one of its advertisements.”  (Compl. ¶ 34.)  This paragraph
alleges that Defendant profited from the advertisements, not that it had knowledge of infringing
activity by other parties.  In sum, in the absence of a specific, unambiguous allegation that some
person or entity other than Defendant infringed its trademark, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff
has stated a claim for contributory infringement.  Therefore, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion
as to this claim.  
B. Whether Plaintiff’s State Law Claims are Barred by the Communications
Decency Act
The Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (“CDA”) states that “[n]o provider or
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  An
“interactive computer service” refers to “any information service, system, or access software
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provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server,
including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems
operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.”  Id. § 230(f)(2).  The three
elements required for immunity pursuant to section 230(c) are as follows: “(1) that the defendant
is a provider or user of an ‘interactive computer service;’ (2) that the asserted claims treat the
defendant as the publisher or speaker of the information; and (3) that the information is provided
by another ‘information content provider.’”  Parker v. Google, Inc., 242 F. App’x 833, 838 (3d
Cir. 2007).  Importantly, the CDA provides that “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no
liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”  47
U.S.C. § 230(e)(3).
Here, Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s claims for violations of the UTPCPL (Count IV),
interference with contractual and prospective contractual relations (Count V), and unjust
enrichment (Count VI) are barred by the CDA.  (Def.’s Mem. 20-23.)  Specifically, Defendant
asserts that it is entitled to CDA immunity because it is an interactive computer service and its
alleged liability for these state law claims is premised on its role in publishing content created by
others.  (Id. at 21.)  In response, Plaintiff argues that its state law claims derive solely from
Defendant’s own conduct rather than that of any third parties.  (Pl.’s Resp. Opp’n 16-17.) 
According to Plaintiff, the Complaint alleges “that Defendant used the ‘AMERIGAS’ trademark
(1) in its website subdomains, text and metadata, and (2) to trigger advertisements from
AmeriGas’[s] competitors on Defendant’s ‘AmeriGas’ subdomain.”  (Id. at 16.)10
  Plaintiff separately argues that Defendant is not entitled to CDA immunity because its10
state law claims arise under laws that pertain to intellectual property.  (Pl.’s Resp. Opp’n 17-18
(citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or expand any
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A review of the three counts at issue demonstrates that these claims are in fact premised on
Defendant’s own conduct.  The UTPCPL claim (Count IV) asserts, among other allegations, that
Defendant has been “passing off goods and services advertised on the PissedConsumer.com
website as those of AmeriGas’s” and “[u]sing deceptive representations in connection with goods
and services advertised on [the] PissedConsumer.com website and with AmeriGas’s goods and
services[.]”  (Compl. ¶ 87.)  The claim for interference with contractual and prospective
contractual relations (Count V) alleges that Defendant “is aware that the postings on the
PissedConsumer website as well as the misleading and confusing advertisements on the
PissedConsumer website are likely to make it so that AmeriGas’s customers and prospective
customers no longer do business with AmeriGas.”  (Id. ¶ 96.)  Finally, the unjust enrichment
claim (Count VI) alleges that Defendant “knowingly benefited from its use of AmeriGas’s
trademark in conjunction with its advertising programs and has retained the benefits of its use of
AmeriGas’s trademarks[.]”  (Id. ¶ 103.)  Finally, incorporated by reference into all of these counts
is Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant “encourages and creates the most negative postings it can
on the PissedConsumer website[.]”  (Id. ¶ 20.)  
The Complaint therefore explicitly alleges that Defendant not only allows third parties to
post complaints on its website, it actually creates some of these posts as well.  The above claims
also allege that Defendant exercises a degree of control over the advertisements on its webpage. 
In this respect, the present action is distinguishable from Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 732
F. Supp. 2d 628 (E.D. Va. 2010), a case relied upon by Defendant.  In Rosetta Stone, the court
law pertaining to intellectual property.”).)  Because the Court finds that Plaintiff adequately
alleged that these claims derive from Defendant’s own conduct, it declines to consider this
argument.    
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found that the defendant was entitled to CDA immunity because it qualified as an interactive
computer service and because the third parties advertising on the defendant’s website were
responsible for selecting the terms that triggered the appearance of their ads.  732 F. Supp. 2d at
633.  Here, even if the Court assumes that Defendant qualifies as an interactive computer service,
it cannot determine how Defendant’s advertising system operates.  While Defendant argues that it
does not control the advertising on its website, (Def.’s Reply Br. 13.), the Complaint alleges
otherwise.  (See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 33 (alleging that Defendant itself “displays numerous
advertisements for third parties’ products and services”); id. ¶ 103 (alleging that Defendant
“knowingly benefited from its use of AmeriGas’s trademark in conjunction with its advertising
programs”) (emphasis added).)  The Court recognizes that elsewhere in the Complaint, Plaintiff
alleges that the advertising on Defendant’s website is implemented through Google’s “AdWords”
program, so the actual degree of control that Defendant exercises over the advertisements—as
compared to the control exercised by Google or the advertisers themselves—is not entirely clear. 
(See Compl. ¶¶ 34, 36.)  At this stage of the litigation, however, the Court lacks information
pertaining to how “AdWords” actually functions, and the Complaint alleges that Defendant had at
least some role in how the advertisements are displayed.  Therefore, to the extent that the state law
claims are premised on Defendant’s placement of and profit from third party advertisements, they
may proceed.  The Court therefore denies Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts IV, V, and VI. 
Nothing in this Memorandum, however, precludes Defendant from asserting CDA immunity as a
defense later in this litigation.11
  In addition to seeking dismissal of the state law claims pursuant to the CDA,11
Defendant also contends that these claims could be dismissed on the merits.  (Def.’s Mem. 23
n.5.)  This argument, however, is made in a footnote near the conclusion of the section of
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IV. CONCLUSION  
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes as follows: (1) Plaintiff has properly
alleged that Defendant used its “AMERIGAS” trademark in commerce and in connection with
goods and services; (2) at the pleadings stage of the litigation, the Court cannot determine whether
Defendant’s nominative use of Plaintiff’s mark is fair; (3) Plaintiff has alleged likelihood of
confusion, and may rely on the doctrine of initial interest confusion; (4) Plaintiff has failed to
properly allege that any party other than Defendant infringed upon its trademark; and (5) Plaintiff
has sufficiently alleged that its state law claims are premised on the conduct of Defendant itself,
rather than the actions of third parties.  Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss all claims
premised on a theory of contributory infringement is granted.  In all other respects, the Motion to
Dismiss is denied.
An appropriate Order follows.  
Defendant’s brief that discusses CDA immunity.  Therefore, the Court has trouble concluding
that Defendant has properly moved for dismissal on this basis.  Indeed, Plaintiff has not even
responded to this argument.  Accordingly, while Defendant is not precluded from moving to
dismiss these claims on the merits at a later time, the Court declines to consider its argument in
the current Memorandum.      
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